Whether focused on Chinese defense and security issues, Beijing's foreign policies, bilateral relations, political developments, economic affairs, or social change, our analysts adhere to the same spirit of non-partisanship, objectivity, and empiricism that is the hallmark of CNA research.
Introduction
For decades, China has nurtured very cordial and complex political, economic, and military relations with Pakistan. The two governments habitually describe their ties in glowing terms as an "all-weather friendship" that is "higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans." The two countries maintain robust official exchanges at all levels, conduct combined military and anti-terrorism exercises, and hold regular security, economic, and consular dialogues. China has provided Pakistan with nuclear assistance; made key investments in Pakistan's port, transportation, and resource development infrastructure; and contributed to Pakistan's national security by making military sales and cooperating on weapons platform production. (Appendix A presents a timeline of China-Pakistan interactions.)
On March 27, 2009, the Obama administration unveiled a comprehensive new strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan which recognizes and addresses the synergistic role that Pakistan plays as a safe haven for Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. Initially dubbed the "Af-Pak Strategy," this strategy treats Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single theater of operations and focuses U.S. policy more intensively than before on Pakistan as a factor in regional stability. The new focus gives China's role in Pakistan a special significance for U.S. policy.
On March 31, 2010, CNA China Studies hosted a half-day roundtable to discuss China's relations with and activities in Pakistan. (Appendix B presents the agenda of this roundtable.) Participants included U.S. government officials, active-duty military personnel, and analysts from think-tanks in Washington and Brussels. CNA asked the roundtable participants to address the following issues:
• the nature of the China-Pakistan bilateral relationship;
• the interests and equities of each government involved; • the changing trends and circumstances that may be affecting the relationship; and • the implications of the relationship for the region and for U.S. interests. This CNA report is based primarily on the presentations, findings, and discussions at the CNA roundtable and supplemented by contextual data and analysis by the author. This report does not represent a fully coordinated consensus of the roundtable participants. Points based on independent research are footnoted as such; points raised by panelists or in the discussion are attributed to the roundtable in the text.
Background: The Importance of the Historical Relationship
As one roundtable participant stressed, both Pakistan and China place great weight on the historical context of their relationship. They view their presentChina is an all-weather friend. day relations as part of a long-standing The U.S. is a fair-weather friend. association in which the positive past anchors both current and future relations.
According to roundtable participants, the tendency of PRC and Pakistani leaders to call their relations an "all-weather" friendship reflects this historical continuity even given the changing circumstances in both countries. In contrast, participants said, Pakistan sees the United States as a "fair-weather" friend that tends to place less weight on what has happened in the past and to focus instead on the future and on U.S. interests and priorities.
This historical context for Sino-Pakistan relations dates back to 1950, when Pakistan became one of the first countries to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, even when the U.S.-Pakistan relationship was strong.' From the outset, the two countries were brought closer together by mutual tensions and border conflicts with India. Appendix A describes key events in the ChinaPakistan bilateral relationship.
China-Pakistan Relations: Long-Term Fundamental Interests, Changing Circumstances
Roundtable participants pointed out that any examination of current Sino-Pakistan relations needs to begin with several caveats. First, much about China's interests in and relations with Pakistan is conducted below the radar. Sino-Pakistan relations are among the "less researched of the world's important relationships," according to one participant, and what little scholarship does exist is fairly recent. In addition, PRC leaders much prefer to pursue issues bilaterally with their "all-weather friend," offering few opportunities to observe or coordinate with Chinese actions in multilateral settings. This propensity for bilateral action appears true even on issues such as economic development and regional stability, where Beijing shares key interests with the United States. By the same token, China is seen to be especially close mouthed about the relationship. One participant pointed out that China rarely goes public with any criticism of Pakistan, instead favoring private channels to communicate its interests and concerns. By contrast, Pakistan more frequently offers public praise for the importance of its relations with China and of PRC activities in Pakistan.
Second, although China's relations with Pakistan are close and multi-dimensional, one roundtable participant maintained that there is not a consensus view in Beijing about its relationship with Pakistan or about China's appropriate role there. Several fundamental, long-standing elements of Sino-Pakistan relations remain dominant, but newer issues and circumstances have arisen since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Not only do these new issues appear to be affecting China's relations with Pakistan at the margins, but according to one participant, the implications that these developments have for PRC policy are the subject of For instance, according to one roundtable participant, China has sought to de-link Pakistan from Afghanistan issues, seeking to weed out the Afghanistan portions of "Af-Pak" proposals made by the United States. Likewise, China appears only tangentially interested in pursuing multilateral efforts in support of Pakistan. For example, while serving as a founding member in September 2008 of such a group, the "Friends of Democratic Pakistan," China is seen to have sent lower level representatives to ministerial meetings than have other founding members. The September 2009 ministerial meeting in New York, for instance, was chaired by President Barack Obama, Pakistan's President Asif Ali Zardari, and UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and was attended by twelve other heads of government; China, however, was represented by its then Ambassador to the United Nations, Ambassador Zhang Yesui, according to one roundtable participant.
ongoing debate in PRC policy circles, both between ministries and within them. The new trends and China's reaction to them have potentially important policy implications for all parties involved, including the United States.
Traditional Interests Still Guide Bilateral Relations
According to roundtable participants, traditional geo-political interests still underpin the China-Pakistan relationship. These include:
• mutual strategic concerns about India;
• combating terrorism and assuring domestic stability;
• reliance on strong military-to-military relations; and
• pursuit of growing, though uneven, economic ties.
These shared interests (discussed in greater detail below) are the ballast for the mutual support that the two governments provide for one another in multilateral institutions such as the United Nations and in regional relations. The predominance of security issues also helps explain the strong Sino-Pakistan military-to-military relationship.
China counts on Pakistan to strongly support Beijing's position on some of China's vital national objectives -namely, the PRC position that Taiwan is sovereign Chinese territory, that Tibet and Xinjiang have long been part of China, and that China is justified in acting forcefully to assure ethnic stability in these areas. Pakistan often re-states its support for these Chinese positions in its public references to China-Pakistan relations. China also can often count on Pakistan to act as an intermediary for China in the Islamic world. From Pakistan's perspective, Beijing has served as a loyal and trusted friend in what otherwise is a rough neighborhood. Islamabad can count on China to back its stand on India and its position on Kashmir. It also sees China as an important partner in providing Pakistan with help for its national security needs and with critical aid and investment to improve Pakistan's weak infrastructure. Finally, Pakistan sees China's friendship over the years as having been steadfast and dependable, in contrast to U.S. assistance to Pakistan, which is seen as having varied with U.S. policy priorities and administrations.
But participants suggested that in some respects, China and Pakistan each have their own weighted (and not necessarily symmetrical) priorities within these core issues -for example, emphasizing different counter-terror priorities. In addition, changing global and national circumstances may be beginning to shape some of these core elements in ways that require subtle adaptation by one or the other party.
Mutual Strategic Concerns About India
Roundtable participants maintained that India remains a central focus of China's and Pakistan's geopolitical concerns, dating back to a time when the Soviet Union was India's principal patron. China and Pakistan have similar geographical and historical concerns with respect to India. These include:
• shared borders with India, in Pakistan's northeast and China's southwest; • a history of hostility and confrontation with India; and • a mutual interest in maneuvering to balance or contain India's power and influence in the region. These competing perspectives suggest that the Chinese government is likely to continue to see India as both an attractive economic opportunity and a source of increasing security concern. If true, Beijing is likely to continue to pursue economic ties with India while hedging its security bets by having close ties with Pakistan and other regional security arrangements.
Combating Terrorism and Ensuring Stability
China's and Pakistan's views on stability and counter-terrorism are somewhat symbiotic and at first blush appear to be identical. Counter-terrorism remains one of China's interests as well as a key objective in its relations with Pakistan, and both governments see stability as a core interest. But roundtable participants suggested that the focus of China's and Pakistan's counter-terror interests here differ in important respects.
Pakistan's Focus
Roundtable participants suggested that Islamic extremist groups and their supporters present a unique political and existential challenge for the secular government of President Zardari, forcing Islamabad to walk a fine line between competing priorities. Islamabad has its own domestic security interests, with ethnic divisions periodically inflamed by perceived economic inequities, and a number of separatist movements backed up by armed rebel groups challenging the government. Against this, the Pakistani government also faces strong pressure from U.S. and Chinese counter-terror interests in Afghanistan and Xinjiang, respectively, to crack down on extremist groups that challenge their interests. U.S. pressure is particularly strong concerning Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters from Afghanistan seeking haven in Pakistan's remote northwest. The Pakistan government reportedly also on occasion has responded to Chinese requests for help in aiding its own counter-terror efforts in Xinjiang. One roundtable participant claimed that Islamabad has given useful intelligence to China on extremist activities, and has served as a broker and intermediary with the Taliban and other extremist groups on China's behalf.
But such crackdowns and intelligence-sharing efforts bring countervailing pressure on the government from indigenous Pakistani groups. counter-terror activities. As stated above, one participant asserted that China has accepted some Pakistani help in achieving its own counter-terror ends. But another participant suggested that China wants to "de-couple" the ETIM from the broader universe of global terrorism, treating it as a uniquely Chinese concern and responsibility. Still another maintained that Chinese leaders consider the mechanism of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has six members and includes Pakistan as an observer, to be the country's "first line of defense" for dealing with broader, cross-border counter-terror issues. 8 Other participants asserted that Beijing appears to be relatively unconcerned about Islamic extremists who operate entirely outside of Chinese borders and who do not target China's interests in Pakistan or in China itself. If true, they said, Chinese leaders are not likely to be interested in pushing Pakistan's government or military to take actions against indigenous terrorist groups that are not causing a direct problem for PRC interests.
Further study on this topic is warranted. But based on initial conclusions from the various roundtable views, Beijing prefers to, and may even be confident that it can, handle its own domestic problems in Xinjiang, although it apparently is willing to accept limited outside help in achieving this objective. For the most part, though, China's view of its counter-terrorism interests appears to be defined by its own ethnic separatism concerns rather than through a global lens. China appears more
The ETIM has been labeled a terrorist group by both Beijing and Washington; the latter designated ETIM a terrorist organization in 2002.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was founded in 2001 with China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as founding members. India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan have observer status. The U.S. has petitioned for observer status in the SCO but has been turned down.
interested in maintaining a diplomatic counter-terror wall around its western border, using the SCO countries and Pakistan as barriers to keep terrorist elements out. What goes on beyond that protective barrier seems of tertiary concern for Chinese policy.
Reliance on Strong Military-to-Military Relations
Roundtable participants stressed that military relations have long been the most important and vibrant component of China-Pakistan relations. Much in the relationship is seen to be militarily led, and China's PLA is thought to weigh heavily in China's strategic decisions on Pakistan. Bilateral military cooperation is "unusually strong" and ranges from naval cooperation, to past nuclear assistance, to arms sales, to combined military and anti-terror exercises.
These examples of cooperation underscore the high degree of institutional trust that has arisen between the two militaries. PLA personnel have worked for years to build an impressive network of connections with Pakistan's military establishment. Consequently, according to one participant, Pakistan has a significant level of confidential communications and military-to-military trust with China, encouraged by the fact that, in the words of this participant, "nothing ever leaks from the Chinese side."
According to one roundtable observer, China's leaders have faith that Pakistan's military establishment can handle the terrorist threats, ethnic disturbances, and tribal clashes that might damage China's own interests. The same observer maintained that this faith in the military is accompanied by the PRC's lack of confidence in and distaste for the Pakistan civilian government. According to this observer, Chinese interlocutors freely admit a preference for the military-led governments of Pakistan's past, and it is primarily Pakistan's military that Beijing continues to view as the reliable guarantor of PRC interests in Pakistan.
The close relationship between the two military establishments appears to give China consistent and relatively unencumbered access to military policy processes and decision-makers in Pakistan regardless of oscillations in Beijing's relationship with Pakistan's civilian leadership. A question for further research is whether Pakistan's civilian-controlled government, combined with the increase in terrorism concerns from neighboring Afghanistan, has led Beijing to perceive that Pakistan has at least a diminished capacity, if not a diminished willingness, to protect growing Chinese interests in Pakistan. 
Uneven but Growing Economic Relations
According to roundtable participants, China's bilateral economic relationship with Pakistan has been uneven. Nevertheless, PRC trade with and investment in Pakistan has grown significantly since 2000 and has attracted increasing commentary from U.S. and Western observers. It was widely agreed that PRC investments in Pakistan primarily are driven by China's demand for energy and natural resources, and Pakistan's need for infrastructure to accommodate the development of both. Although China stands to reap considerable benefits from these and other economic activities, participants at the roundtable noted that to date Pakistan has been the primary beneficiary of the bilateral economic relationship. Participants also maintained that economic ties remain the weakest leg in bilateral relations, not only in comparison to military-to-military ties but, as shown in table 2, even in comparison to some of China's other regional economic relationships, such as India or Iran, which appear more dynamic economically even without the benefit of an "all-weather friendship" status. China's most prominent economic investments in Pakistan all appear to be related to energy, resources, and transportation infrastructure. These include: As roundtable participants suggested, Pakistan seems to be the biggest beneficiary to date in the economic relationship. Chinese-financed nuclear and hydropower projects in the country are providing sorely needed electrical power to an impoverished country with few hydrocarbon resources and serious power shortages. If Chinese plans to build oil and gas pipelines transiting Pakistan territory come to fruition, Pakistan will gain lease revenues and annual transport fees. The Gwadar Port and Karakoram Highway provide Pakistan with key connections that it can use to take greater advantage of global economic growth.
But it is also clear that China stands to reap future benefits from its current and planned infrastructure investments in Pakistan. Potential pipeline projects via South and Central Asia would help China diversify its energy supply routes, making China's energy sources less susceptible to interruption by piracy, terrorism, or the actions of other powers, such as India or the United States. Taken in concert, the Gwadar Port, Karakoram Highway, and planned rail lines provide landlocked western China with its only ocean access, giving China a more efficient and costeffective transport route to use in developing its restive western regions.
New Developments Affecting Sino-Pakistan Relations
Roundtable participants raised several new issues that they believe are beginning to pose new complications at the margins of China-Pakistan relations. According to II one participant, these complications appear to be affecting PRC policy deliberations. This participant maintained that there is an ongoing debate in PRC policy circles, both within and among China's military, government, and academic institutions, on how they should be weighted in comparison with the traditional core elements in Sino-Pakistan relations.
Growing Counter-terrorism Challenges
The suggested changing nature of each country's counter-terror interests is a new challenge to the relationship. Given the growing international nature and connectivity of terrorism, roundtable participants said that China's domestic problems with counter-terrorism sometimes rise to a more prominent level in the bilateral relationship. Despite Beijing's preference to handle such issues unilaterally, Pakistan's terrorism problems are more often becoming China's terrorism problems. Most importantly, said participants, Pakistani religious schools, or madrasses, have attracted students from the Chinese Uighur Muslim community in Xinjiang. Some of these students reportedly are then recruited by Taliban groups and the ETIM, with direct and destabilizing consequences for China."
The roundtable discussion suggested that such issues have become a muted source of tension in China-Pakistan relations, prompting China to exert varying degrees of pressure on the Pakistani government and military to do more to halt this potential challenge to Chinese national security interests. According to one participant, China handles most of these tensions quietly through its extensive private channels with Pakistan and its military. Seldom does such a problem rise even to the level of polite public comment by PRC officials, according to this participant.
Still, such issues presumably are creating a low, pulsing drumbeat in the background for harmonious China-Pakistan relations. Efforts by extremist groups in Pakistan to link up with those in western China are likely to be viewed with alarm by Beijing. Moreover, such pressures from extremist groups in Pakistan could begin to affect China's propensity to handle its Xinjiang problems on its own. As a result, China is likely to continue to press Pakistan to step up its anti-terror activities, much as the United States is doing. Several conceivable worst-case scenarios come to mind: the end of secular government in Pakistan and installment of an extremist Taliban regime; or an increasingly chaotic internecine battle between ethnic and tribal groups that makes economic development impossible. Either could cause increasing incursions from Pakistan into western China, inflaming passions among ethnic Muslims in Xinjiang, decreasing stability, and disrupting China's larger western and regional development plans.
Increase in Real and Perceived Threats to Chinese Interests
The PRC appears to be less concerned than the United States about terrorism in Pakistan. It seems to view terrorism as only a lower-level threat to its interests: as one roundtable participant put it, China is "content to let the United States remain the primary target" of terrorist extremist groups. That said, China's expanding economic presence and visibility, both in Pakistan and in the region, potentially make Beijing more directly vulnerable to extremist threats than in the past. One participant suggested that these emerging challenges, their potential implications, and China's policy response all are part of the ongoing internal PRC debate about the nature of its interests in Pakistan. Among these concerns, according to participants, are:
• Chinese-built nuclear power plants in Pakistan, the Karakoram Highway, and the Cwadar deep sea port were pointed out as particularly high-value potential targets for unrest and extremism in Pakistan. The Karakoram Highway has been attacked in the past, as have Chinese engineers working in Gwadar.
• The population of Chinese citizens in Pakistan, while small in numbers (one participant estimated there are between 7,000 and 10,000 Chinese living in Pakistan) still has attracted increasing attention from some militant groups in recent years. 14 One participant pointed out the Red Mosque confrontation in 2007 as one of a number of examples where Chinese citizens were specifically targeted by extremist groups."
Concern for the safety of Chinese citizens in Pakistan is one subject that, according to roundtable participants, occasionally has risen to the level of rare public comment by Chinese leaders. According to one participant, the level of PRC concern about such potential threats is more readily gauged by looking at planned Chinese investment that has not taken place. This participant maintained, for instance, that in 2009 China suspended plans to build a coastal oil refinery near the Gwadar Port in part because of such concerns. Other Pakistan-based news reports suggested that the global economic meltdown was a key factor, but also referred to ongoing security concerns that may have affected investment plans.' 6
Problems with Pakistan's Civilian Government
Roundtable participants suggested that Pakistan's current civilian government is another new element in the bilateral relationship. According to one participant, the 
Growing U.S. Regional Role
There was broad agreement at the roundtable that since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the growing U.S. role in Central and South Asia also has troubled Chinese leaders and raised new issues in China's relationship with Pakistan. Several participants described this as a two-edged concern. On the one hand, they noted, the United States and China share a common interest in working for Pakistan's stability and its economic and political viability, and so China is comfortable with U.S. actions that help support Pakistan's economy and bolster the stability of its regime. On the other hand, according to one participant, Chinese leaders also tend to view the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan and the growing U.S. involvement with Pakistan as one of the catalysts for regional unrest, making China uncomfortable with the U.S. role.
Roundtable participants felt that this did not mean Chinese leaders are necessarily anxious for the United States to fail in achieving its regional objectives. A U.S. failure could lead at best to further instability in Pakistan, or at worst to the installation of a fundamentalist religious government in Islamabad. Neither would serve PRC interests. But they also felt that Chinese leaders were not necessarily anxious for the United States to succeed in its regional objectives. Roundtable participants said that Beijing sees direct and potentially negative policy consequences for China's interests in the event of U.S. regional success -most notably the possibility of a firmer U.S. role in Pakistan and India as part of what they fear is a conscious U.S. "encirclement" strategy for China.
The Limitations of the "Bilateral" Perspective
Although the effect of broader regional dynamics was not an issue posed to roundtable participants at the outset, the broad consensus at the roundtable was that the study of the China-Pakistan bilateral relationship itself is too low power a lens to provide an accurate comprehensive policy picture for U.S. decision-makers. Participants strongly suggested that the China-Pakistan relationship cannot be clearly understood without accounting for the strong gravitational pull of a number "Quadrilateral" Dynamics: China, Pakistan, India, the United States
Several participants maintained that China-Pakistan relations could only be properly understood in terms of a "quadrilateral relationship" involving China, Pakistan, India, and the United States. These participants argued that such an approach is critical, given the following factors:
• India's primacy as a core concern of both China and Pakistan;
• the involvement of Pakistani extremist groups in violent attacks in India;
• the growing U.S. role in and military assistance to Pakistan;
• the singular importance of U.S.-China relations on the world stage; and
• the recent changes in both the U.S. and Chinese involvement with India.
U.S. interests in Pakistan have evolved over time, according to these participants, from a primary focus on India-Pakistan hostility to new concerns including antiterrorism and bolstering Pakistan's democratic institutions. One participant described U.S. relations with Pakistan as having become "de-hyphenated" from U.S. relations with India, with Washington now having separate bilateral interests with each government that transcend Indo-Pakistan tensions. In addition, while Pakistan's economy has languished, India's economic development in recent years has strengthened. This has given the United States economic equities with India that it does not have with Pakistan, strengthening the potential importance of the U.S.-India relationship as a result.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan Dimension
The growing interconnection among various events involving Islamic extremism in Afghanistan and Pakistan also complicates our understanding of China-Pakistan relations. The United States has emphasized the importance of these linkages with the new "Af-Pak," or Afghanistan-Pakistan policy strategy, unveiled by the Obama administration in 2009. According to several participants, the PRC prefers to act bilaterally with Pakistan, and Beijing neither has the same threat assessment about Pakistan nor the same hierarchy of priorities that the United States has. Consequently, according to these participants, Beijing does not appear to view coordination with the United States on "Af-Pak" as either desirable or productive for Chinese interests. Nevertheless, China also has growing interests in Afghanistan that directly affect its relations with Pakistan and its counter-terrorism goals in Xinjiang. It was suggested that policy discourse in Beijing is beginning to examine this connection.
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Central Asia and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
A number of participants believed that Pakistan's geographic location, close to Central Asia's oil and gas resources, is a critical additional consideration for ChinaPakistan relations. They pointed out that Pakistan provides China with its only direct western ocean access, making it an important factor in China's ability to more efficiently exploit both Central Asian and its own western energy resources.
Implications for U.S. Interests
There was agreement at the roundtable discussion that when it comes to Pakistan, the United States and China share important existential concerns. Both view stability in Pakistan as an important policy goal, and both see their interests as being better served by secular government rule in Pakistan than by the ascension of a hard-line or fundamentalist regime. Apart from these basic interests, however, it was suggested that Sino-U.S. coordination on Pakistan will continue to be complicated by the fact that the two governments share neither the same sense of threat from Pakistan nor the same hierarchy of policy interests.
Challenges to cooperation or coordination
Because China and the United States share neither the same sense of threat from Pakistan nor the same hierarchy of policy interests, cooperation will remain elusive.
In recent years, the U.S. emphasis on Pakistan has been tied heavily to U.S. deployments and military actions in Afghanistan. In addition, the United States remains focused on the broader terrorist threat posed by extremist groups in the region, on the democratization process in Pakistan, and on enhancing the viability and durability of Pakistan's domestic institutions. China, it was suggested, is more relaxed about Pakistan's domestic situation, including terrorism on the southwest frontier border. Rather, China's interests are focused on its own domestic security in Xinjiang, on its border disputes with India, and on the India-Pakistan relationship and its implications for Chinese interests and assets in the region. At a basic level, then, these differing threat perceptions and priority ranking of national interests suggest that any broad-based U.S.-China cooperation on development or anti-terrorism in Pakistan would face challenges.
• China's preference for bilateral action in Pakistan suggests the limited utility of multilateral vehicles, such as the Friends of Democratic Pakistan, for achieving meaningful Chinese participation in support of U.S. objectives either in Pakistan or more broadly throughout the region.
• Beijing's suspicion of U.S. intent in seeking a broader reach in South Asia means that Chinese leaders are likely to continue to move cautiously on matters that would appear, either deliberately or incidentally, to strengthen the U.S. position in Pakistan.
Not a threat to US interests in the region
On the other hand, the roundtable discussion also suggested that there was only a limited possibility that China's presence in Pakistan would undermine near-term US interests in the region. Beijing reaps collateral economic and political benefits from having the United States seen as the primary engager and target of extremist forces in Pakistan.
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Attainable goal: complementary bilateral relationships
While robust Sino-U.S. cooperation on Pakistan was considered to be less likely in the short term, a number of roundtable participants suggested that there were good possibilities for the United States to carry out separate, but complementary, actions, aid, and infrastructure investments in Pakistan. These need not be directly coordinated with Chinese investments, but could complement them, according to roundtable participants.
For instance, it was suggested that U.S. interests would be furthered if the United States were to invest in projects that would connect Central Asia's gas and oil pipelines to ports in Pakistan, like the Chinese-built Gwadar deep sea port. Such investments would provide economic benefit to Pakistan, strengthen the government's position, and serve another U.S. policy goal: to assure greater economic autonomy in Central Asian republics by offering alternatives to their dependence on Russian pipelines. http://www.iri.org/news-events-press-center/news/iri-releases-survey-pakistan-public-opinion
